CarnegieCorporate Circle

Maritime power is a central foundation of China’s global rise, and it means far more than just building a world-class naval force. Beijing’s competitive advantages arise from its powerhouse maritime industries, such as shipping, ports, shipbuilding, and fishing. China has developed and employed maritime power in its foreign and security policy and now actively contests American command of strategic maritime space in the Western Pacific and, increasingly, across the globe.

Marking one-year since Russia’s invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, the war in Ukraine is now the largest military conflict of the cyber age and the first to incorporate such significant levels of cyber operations on all sides. Join Jon Bateman and Gavin Wilde both Senior Fellows in the Technology and International Affairs Program as they discuss their research Cyber Conflict in the Russia-Ukraine War, a paper series that is part of a long, global effort to understand the cyber elements of the Ukraine war and cyber competition going forward.

The climate crisis is a reality humans are already facing, but the majority of analysts in policy and research fields still significantly underestimate the effects that climate change—and our response to its many aspects—will have on ecological, political, economic, and social structures. Carnegie’s Sustainability, Climate, and Geopolitical program focuses on these global governance challenges and builds on Carnegie’s global network build a bridge between scientific research and policy action to tackle these increasingly complex set of issues.

China’s mediation of the Saudi-Iran normalization agreement signals a potential break from its longstanding policy of keeping to a minimal and economically oriented regional footprint. By successfully bringing two of the Middle East’s deep rivals to the negotiation table, China aims to build credibility as a capable partner in a region that has at times protested American security disengagement and bemoaned Washington’s strategic neglect. However, China’s ability to achieve its proclaimed objectives of peacefully resolving Middle Eastern conflicts and realizing regional stability will now be put to the test.

The Biden administration has made strengthening ties with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific—especially Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India—the centerpiece of its efforts to counter Chinese influence in the region and its strategy for responding to Chinese aggression against Taiwan. A closer look, however, suggests that most allies and partners will be significantly constrained in the support they are able or willing to provide economically and militarily to a U.S.-led coalition against China, limiting U.S. options and increasing the burden on U.S. military forces. This has important implications for how the United States should be approaching its relationship with China and planning for a Taiwan-focused contingency.

Top U.S. officials say the strategy is to outcompete China, to maintain an enduring competitive edge over it. At the same time, they say they want to cooperate with China on some issues. How do we do both? Is the competition zero-sum – only one winner and one loser – or is it some other kind of competition? If it is not win-win, why would China cooperate? Similarly, U.S. officials have also shifted rhetoric from tech “decoupling” with China to “de-risking”. What’s the difference? These are a few of the questions we will address in this month’s corporate circle.