Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
The system of treaties, agreements, and institutions underpinning the nonproliferation regime is increasingly stressed by burgeoning arms races and growing discord over the lack of progress toward disarmament. What steps can be taken to halt, and if possible, reverse this trend?
Under what conditions does nuclear latency—the technical capacity to build the bomb—enable states to pursue effective coercion? And what are the consequences of using nuclear and rocket technology as a bargaining tool in world politics?
The concerns that motivate interest in and demand for nuclear disarmament are formidable and deserve fuller and deeper address than they have received thus far in the policy deliberations of many States and international bodies.
States and experts preoccupied with winning (or at least not losing) wars that could go nuclear have largely ignored questions of post facto accountability.
What model for nuclear disarmament might a nuclear-armed state demand of its adversaries and accept for itself? If states were to commit to dismantle their nuclear arsenals, what would be the key benchmarks for assessing the progressive implementation of such a commitment?
If some nuclear arsenals and operational plans are especially likely to threaten the global environment and food supply, all states would benefit from actions to reduce such risks.
Responding directly to the invitation in the United States’ working paper presented to the states preparing to review the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, this paper aims to encourage governments, international experts, and civil society to undertake dialogue on Creating the Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament.
The world is vastly different from when the nuclear order was built: proliferation risks and interest in nuclear energy are much lower, but regional insecurities raise danger of escalatory warfare. Meanwhile, the have/have not inequities impair cooperation to restore the foundation of order.