This Q&A was adapted from a Carnegie live event assessing China-EU relations one year into the war in Ukraine. It has been edited for clarity.
Paul Haenle: China’s approach regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a cause of concern for many in Europe and appears to have caused China some reputational damage.
French President Emmanuel Macron and the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen both visited China. Macron traveled with a delegation of sixty French CEO’s and adopted what some have described as a more business-oriented approach, stressing the importance of economic and commercial ties between Paris and Beijing. Von der Leyen, on the other hand, expressed a tougher approach. In her speech delivered in Brussels one week before traveling to Beijing, she highlighted the need for Europe to “derisk” its economy away from China—distinct, of course, from the notion of decoupling, which is a more extreme term. She pointed out that China’s president has a responsibility to use his influence with [Russian President Vladimir] Putin to improve the situation in Ukraine. Meanwhile, as tensions mount over the war in Ukraine, EU-China economic ties continue to develop. China remains the EU’s largest trading partner with bilateral trade flows that exceeded €850 billion in 2022.
It seems to many in the United States that Europe has two different and, in many ways, contradictory approaches to dealing with China: on the one hand, promoting the importance of economics ties and, on the other hand, expressing concern over risks of overdependence, security issues in the Asia Pacific, challenges with China’s governance approach, and views of human rights. Can these two approaches coexist? Does Europe have a coherent strategy?
Chan Heng Chee: Let me say that the view I will express is that of my region, Southeast Asia.
Given that the European Union is an organization of twenty-seven countries, it would be surprising if [it] did not have differences in foreign policy. It has always been so over the years. There were differing views on Russia, even before the war in Ukraine, about how much to engage with [Moscow]. So, of course, there are differences within Europe on how to deal with China.
Ursula von der Leyen did express a tougher view. She wants to derisk the relationship but not decouple. I think President Macron expressed a view that is far more willing to work with China. But what joins all of Europe together is the realization that it can have differences with China, but it cannot decouple. Von der Leyen said that decoupling is neither practical nor possible. She understands how vast China is and how Europe’s markets are intertwined with China.
Bilateral trade, as you pointed out, is great. Following the war in Ukraine, many in Southeast Asia were unsure about what Europe’s approach would be. Initially, we saw a very unified Europe. But now we are seeing some differences. In Southeast Asia, we don’t think these differences are wrong. We don’t think it weakens Europe. It is just the nature of how states do business.
Yawei Liu: Paul, you mentioned in your opening remarks that Europe views China as a competitor and as a systemic rival. On that front, I think most of the European countries are united.
China today is different from the China of twelve to thirteen years ago. There is growing awareness that China does pose a threat to the global order, which is so important to European countries. There is also awareness of the concern that the Chinese government and other agencies and overseas Chinese, many of whom live in European countries, are considered to be involved in penetrating European society.
The visit by the German chancellor in October 2022, right after the 20th Party Congress, and then the recent visits by the French president, the German foreign minister, and the European Commission president all indicate that it’s not possible for Europe to decouple from China, as Ambassador Chan said. It would be a nightmare, not only for Europe, but also for China. Both are working very hard to maintain relations in the context of growing U.S.-China hostility.
In the words of some of the D.C. think tankers, China has turned the page on the United States. In other words, China feels hopeless that the U.S.-China relationship can be stabilized, and in that context, Europe has become more important for China. . . . It is true Macron is facing a lot of criticism. But I think European businesses are going to speak louder than those who are criticizing him, so maybe Macron’s position won’t change.
Paul Haenle: Yawei, you point out, of course, that European views have shifted. Clearly, there are concerns about areas where China may threaten the global order, but you also point out that Europe is not ready to decouple; there’s still a desire to engage and, in effect, take advantage of the opportunities that exist for Europe but also find ways to deal with the challenges. Your last point is very interesting about the United States and China’s views. In a sense, no matter what China does, they feel the relationship with the United States may not improve. On the other hand, in China’s view, perhaps Europe is still in play as a partner that can be pulled into China’s orbit to a certain degree. And maybe China can be successful in driving some wedges between the U.S. and their European partners.
Dan Bear: I would like to issue a quick corrective from the perception that there’s nothing that China can do to have a more constructive relationship with the United States. I think that perception exists partly because there are some loud voices in Congress that give the impression that the United States is eagerly trying to escalate tensions in some way with China. I think that’s inaccurate as a description of what the White House is trying to do. If people would pay attention to what the Biden administration is saying, their voices are quite sober. I know that the administration has made multiple attempts, including behind the scenes, to try to regain a constructive dialogue with Chinese partners on key issues that we both have to face and that the Chinese side has done quite a lot of damage to those efforts.
For example, you recall Secretary [of State Antony] Blinken’s trip to China was planned until the Chinese decided to send the balloon over the United States, knowing that that was going to create consequences for public perception. It was the Chinese side that sabotaged that attempt at opening dialogue through their behavior. So I think we need to make sure that we’re not letting China off the hook. It takes two sides to make a constructive relationship.
With respect to Europe, I agree that we shouldn’t expect a unified position. Frankly, we don’t hear a unified position from Washington a lot of the time, so why would you hear a unified position from Europe, where the challenges of coordination are perhaps even greater? Because of its history and its form as an economic bloc, the EU tends to be more aligned on economic policy and tends to show differing assessments of the security challenges posed both by Russia and by China. People like to make a lot out of divisions within the EU, and certainly there are different perspectives, but those are more differences in tactical assessments of what will work, not differences in terms of long-term goals. The EU is pretty united in terms of being founded on a set of universal values that support a functional international system that is grounded in those values. So, I don’t see those divisions as necessarily deep ideological divisions. They’re more practical divisions.
If I could just offer one observation about President Macron’s trip. There was a lot of blowback after that trip. There was a lot of criticism in Europe that he had perhaps given away too much in his comments. One of the things he spoke about was the need for Europe to develop its own strategic autonomy, which is something that he’s been pushing for a long time—that Europe needs to act as an independent strategic actor.
An irony of this is that the economic relationship is an area where Europe actually has unique leverage, perhaps even more leverage than the United States, because it is a larger market for China than the United States. Europe’s focus on its own dependence on China sometimes obscures what is mutual dependence. China also needs that relationship.
The Chinese government is also concerned about economic growth and the post-pandemic recovery. China makes up about 9 percent of Europe’s exports and about 20 percent of Europe’s imports. There is a $2.5 billion per day trade relationship. If I owe you $200, that’s a problem for me, but if I owe you $200 million, that’s a problem for you. The imbalance in the trade relationship is also a problem for China because it’s a real dependence on European markets for their export-driven economy. The Europeans could use leverage within their negotiations with Beijing much more aggressively if they would put more focus on the fact that Beijing needs them too.