Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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Morocco’s Party of Justice and Development sought to show that it is possible to carve out a larger role for government while remaining loyal to the palace.
State complicity with organized crime is at the heart of instability in the Sahel and Sahara region, fomenting conflict and fueling the rise of al-Qaeda.
The economic platforms of Islamist parties have largely been overlooked, despite the serious challenges that lie ahead for the economies of the Arab world.
Morocco’s friends in the West, especially the United States and France, must pressure Rabat to expedite a significant devolution of power to the Western Sahara to limit the threat of instability.
Arab monarchs have an opportunity to embark on a path of far-reaching political reform without losing their thrones, but the window to act is closing
While Morocco’s poverty rate has fallen by more than 40 percent in the last decade, the country’s leaders must reconsider their poverty-reduction strategy if they want to sustain the positive trend and overcome remaining challenges.
Despite limited electoral success, Islamist movements in the Middle East have failed to influence policy and are criticized by their base for abandoning their religious commitments. Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy explain that Islamist movements must convince their supporters that political participation is the best long-term means to affect government despite seemingly poor short-term gains.
Morocco’s leading Islamist party—the Party for Justice and Development Party (PJD)—is facing growing disillusionment among its supporters after moderating its policies but failing to gain greater political influence.
Free trade agreements between the West (U.S. and EU) and Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, while containing beneficial elements, have strengthened negative perceptions of “western-led globalization” because they benefit unpopular elites and impose serious short term economic adjustment.
Despite passing considerable economic and social reforms, Arab regimes continue to avoid substantive political reforms that would jeopardize their own power. Reformers in ruling establishments recognize the need for change to increase economic competitiveness, but the preferred process of “managed reform” is leading to further political stagnation.