Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1 to 10 of about 59
It is precisely because of, and not in spite of, the fact that Moscow and Pyongyang have repeatedly held their nuclear arsenals over Western heads that leaders should take these threats seriously.
Almost all of the non-nuclear-weapon states that are friends of the United States participate fully in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, which entails rigorous multilateral legal obligations.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s tenth review has been delayed yet again by the coronavirus pandemic. For the postponed review to have the best chance of success, here’s what all the treaty’s parties need to do in the meantime.
The AUKUS security pact between Australia, the UK, and the United States will create precedents that could be used by other countries to pursue nuclear weapons. Here’s how the partners could reduce this risk.
The stage is set for a potentially disruptive period in South Korea–U.S. security relations. If tensions are allowed to build, the alliance could rupture.
Revisions to the U.S.–South Korea missile guidelines open a new era in Seoul’s space ambitions, but their consequences for regional security are limited.
The State Department recently sought to clarify U.S. nuclear posture. It, perhaps inadvertently, makes a strong case for negotiating deep reductions in U.S. and Russian high-yield strategic weapons.
U.S. officials think scrapping the arms control agreement will help check Chinese power. But without allied support, leaving the treaty will only weaken U.S. relationships and play into Beijing’s hands.
With the threat of nuclear war growing, China, Russia, and the United States should not wait until political relations improve before making efforts to manage new technologies.
Rather than use Cold War principles, nuclear states should shift their nuclear doctrines and capabilities to strategic deterrence as needed by the twenty-first century.