Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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The competitive and often antagonistic relationships among China, India, and Pakistan have roots that predate their possession of nuclear weaponry. Yet the significant transformation of the nuclear capabilities that is now underway in all three countries simultaneously complicates and mitigates their geopolitical rivalries.
A partial “decoupling” of U.S. and Chinese technology ecosystems is well underway. Without a clear strategy, Washington risks doing too little or—more likely—too much to curb technological interdependence.
To try to find common ground, this report presents nine detailed practical measures that—implemented individually or as part of a package—would help address each state’s specific security concerns and the shared dangers of arms racing and inadvertent escalation.
If China and the United States can dispel some misperceptions on their dispute over missile defense, it could help forestall a costly, ill-timed nuclear arms race.
In recent years, China has expended considerable efforts to build a sea-based nuclear force for the primary purpose of enhancing its overall nuclear deterrent. Although Beijing’s goal is limited and defensive, the practical implications of its efforts for regional stability and security will be significant.
China is on course to lead the world in the deployment of nuclear power technology by 2030. Should it succeed, China will assume global leadership in nuclear technology development, industrial capacity, and nuclear energy governance.
The risk of an inadvertent nuclear war is rising because of the entanglement of non-nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons and their command-and-control capabilities.
International calls for bilateral engagement are actually counterproductive because they embolden Pakistan to persist in a fruitless strategy of coercion.
At the current juncture of global uncertainty and diversified threats to prosperity, the United States and Japan should work to incorporate their full range of cooperation in more direct service of comprehensive national strategies.
Critical differences between Chinese and U.S. thinking about nuclear weapons and deterrence result not merely from differing security environments and levels of military strength; they also exist because China and the United States have developed their own nuclear philosophies in implementing their security policies over many years.