Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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Moscow’s demands of the United States and NATO are in fact the strategic goals of Russian policy in Europe. If Russia cannot achieve them by diplomatic means, it will resort to other methods.
The new Berlin government is in a difficult spot when it comes to dealing with Russia.
How much additional gas is required to stabilize the European market, and are Russia and other key suppliers able to provide it?
The prompt stabilization of the European gas market is not only in the interests of collapsing European companies, but of Gazprom, too.
Seen from Moscow, Angela Merkel’s long tenure was a period of relative, if not always palatable, predictability in German-Russian relations. The future of the relationship will depend in no small measure on who succeeds her and how skilled that successor is at the art of statecraft. Merkel is leaving behind very big shoes to fill.
Decisions made by NATO may be unpalatable for Moscow, but they are generally consistent and predictable. The same cannot be said of structures such as AUKUS.
The agreement between Germany and the United States, which at first glance appears to be to Russia’s advantage, is in fact beneficial to all parties—even Ukraine.
The experience of the Soviet-American-British wartime coalition was unique and inimitable. Pulling the U.S.-Russian relationship back from the brink of confrontation to less antagonistic rivalry will only be possible in the event of major changes in the domestic politics of one or both countries.
The British government’s Integrated Review implies that there can be no cooperation with Moscow until the Russian government either changes its policies in a fundamental way or is replaced by a government with a very different policy agenda.
The emergence of a Pax Sinica including Russia could draw new dividing lines over Eurasia.