Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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To try to find common ground, this report presents nine detailed practical measures that—implemented individually or as part of a package—would help address each state’s specific security concerns and the shared dangers of arms racing and inadvertent escalation.
Since the 1990s, every U.S. presidential administration has published a Nuclear Posture Review that explains the rationales behind its nuclear strategy, doctrine, and requested forces. The review envisioned and summarized here explicitly elucidates the dilemmas, uncertainties, and tradeoffs that come with current and possible alternative nuclear policies and forces.
If China and the United States can dispel some misperceptions on their dispute over missile defense, it could help forestall a costly, ill-timed nuclear arms race.
It’s becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish a nuclear weapon from a conventional one. The risk of misidentifying either—especially prior to its launch—is an underappreciated and growing danger. At a time of geopolitical uncertainty, this confusion could spark a nuclear war.
In recent years, China has expended considerable efforts to build a sea-based nuclear force for the primary purpose of enhancing its overall nuclear deterrent. Although Beijing’s goal is limited and defensive, the practical implications of its efforts for regional stability and security will be significant.
China is on course to lead the world in the deployment of nuclear power technology by 2030. Should it succeed, China will assume global leadership in nuclear technology development, industrial capacity, and nuclear energy governance.
The risk of escalation sparking a wider conflict—deliberately, inadvertently, or accidentally—between Russia and NATO is dangerously high. This is particularly the case in the Baltics
The risk of an inadvertent nuclear war is rising because of the entanglement of non-nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons and their command-and-control capabilities.
The Iran nuclear deal is merely the cornerstone of a broader, longer-term strategy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and to diminish and counter Iran’s threatening behavior—from its growing ballistic missile arsenal, to its dangerous use of regional proxies, to its human rights abuses at home.
Critical differences between Chinese and U.S. thinking about nuclear weapons and deterrence result not merely from differing security environments and levels of military strength; they also exist because China and the United States have developed their own nuclear philosophies in implementing their security policies over many years.