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If there was once speculation about how the Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko would act in the event of a major regional conflict, that is no longer the case. Belarusian territory is simply a staging area for the Russian army, and the extent of the threat from Belarus is determined by one factor alone: how keen the Kremlin is to go to war.
Lukashenko will have to provide Moscow with constant reminders of his loyalty, and following his recognition of Crimea, there are few options left for further rhetorical and symbolic concessions.
There are no signs that anyone in the EU is ready to bow to Lukashenko’s pressure. There’s no reason to do so. In the worst-case scenario, the EU will end up with a few thousand extra refugees: a drop in the ocean.
In the current situation, the main objective for the Kremlin is to maintain a controlled, pro-Russian transition of power in neighboring Belarus. If that means sacrificing closer integration, so be it.
Putting too much pressure on Belarus right now could backfire and lead to unforeseen consequences. It would appear that Russia understands that, and is therefore playing the long game on integration.
Not so long ago, Minsk scored foreign policy points by positioning itself as a force for regional stability; a counterbalance to an aggressive Russia. Today, Moscow’s unwillingness to get embroiled in conflicts with NATO at the whim of its ally could be the only factor exercising any restraint on Lukashenko.
If Moscow and the West manage to de-escalate their confrontation, Lukashenko’s main currency—his demonstrative anti-Western stance—will be devalued in the eyes of the Kremlin.
Russia is the only country that can truly influence the behavior of the Belarusian regime, so it’s only a matter of time before Western pressure is transferred from Minsk to Moscow.
The Belarusian regime has backed itself into a corner, and is now scared to ease up the pressure, fearing that if angry people are given more freedom, there could be a repetition of last August’s sweeping protests.
Belarus’s weakened position has not altered its traditional interests—or Minsk’s readiness to defend them. This is becoming increasingly obvious as the Belarusian regime regains control over the situation at home.