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The nuclear-armed SLCMs would not be buildable until the early 2030s, so there is time for serious debate.
Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty is a serious problem. However, U.S. withdrawal from the treaty without an effective strategy to focus political blame and strategic pressure on Russia, and to unify allies in a shared effort to stabilize alarming military competitions, would be counterproductive.
There is a serious risk that, within the next few years, Japan will produce more plutonium than it can use. The resulting buildup would set a damaging precedent, exacerbate regional tensions, and increase the likelihood of nuclear terrorism.
The United States and Russia have reached an arms control impasse, and no new agreement is on the horizon. Concrete confidence-building measures could help build trust.
The Asia-Pacific region epitomizes the type of proliferation challenges the international community faces.
Given that products that rely on the same technologies and materials as weapons of mass destruction are everywhere, the challenge for states is to ensure that trade in dual-use goods and technologies does not contribute to WMD proliferation.
While security conditions in Europe remain relatively benign, NATO states should recapitalize their security commitments and clarify their crisis decisionmaking procedures.
Because the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan means that Washington will be less dependent on Pakistani supply lines, it presents a rare opportunity to reconsider American policies and practices in Pakistan.
The next round of U.S.- Russia arms control presents some truly daunting challenges but there is much that the Obama administration could do in the remainder of its first term to lay the groundwork for another treaty while reducing nuclear risks.
The Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan provides Beijing with an opportunity to pause and contemplate conditioning its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan on improvements in nuclear safety and security.