A few weeks ago, Reuters reported that the Saudi soccer club Al-Hilal made an official offer of $400 million a year to the Argentinian superstar Lionel Messi. If accepted, Messi would be the second superstar to sign with a Saudi soccer club after the Portuguese player Cristiano Ronaldo did so last December. Saudi global deals are not restricted to soccer superstars, but extend to holding huge sports and entertainment events, as well as hosting a long list of music superstars that includes major names such as Janet Jackson, Mariah Carey, Justin Bieber, Andrea Bocelli, and BTS.
Some reactions to these events are uncritically celebratory, presenting them as unprecedented and further proof of the Saudi government’s success in “liberating” the Saudi society from its “closedness.” Other reactions quickly dismiss them as the government’s attempt to launder its image and distract, as stated by Amnesty International in its comment on Ronaldo’s signing, from its “appalling human rights record.”
Both of these positions are limited and overlook the broader context within which these events and activities take place. This context is primarily related to two strategic government programs that constitute essential parts of the Vision 2030 project. The first is called “Quality of Life” and aims to transform Saudi cities from cultural, sports, and entertainment voids to vibrant “global” cities that compete with other international destinations in attracting tourists, investments, and talents. The second program is “Human Capability Development,” which aims to shift citizens’ identities and behaviors from conservative and reliant on government spending (as perceived by the government) to those which are more appropriate for “a global competitive citizen.” These programs, like others within the Vision 2030 project, are driven by the goals of attracting foreign investments, diversifying the economy, and reducing government spending. They are managed by a new bureaucratic elite with a managerialist ideology that implements its neoliberal agenda through authoritarian means, disregarding the opinions and interests of the citizens they aim to transform.
Contrary to the celebratory narrative about a “closed” Saudi society being liberated by Vision 2030, these programs are not unprecedented in Saudi history. For example, starting in 1992, the Saudi General Presidency of Youth Welfare introduced and hosted three consecutive rounds of an international soccer competition called “Confederations Cup.” The competition was later adopted by the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and became the second most important international soccer tournament until 2019. Furthermore, prior to signing Ronaldo, Saudi soccer clubs have been a destination for several soccer stars, including Bebeto, Stoichkov, and Wilhelmsson.
In terms of entertainment, Saudi clubs were not limited to sports but also served as cultural and social hubs. From the 1960s to the mid-1980s, they were the main venues for music festivals and stage plays in Saudi Arabia. Since the late 1990s, various regions and districts in Saudi Arabia have organized periodic entertainment festivities, such as the Abha Music Festival, Jeddah Ghair, and the Janadriyah national heritage and culture festival, as well as numerous summer and holiday festivals across many towns.
However, prior to 2017, Saudi Arabia’s entertainment and sports policies were underfunded, unsustainable, and implemented by a fragmented bureaucratic system that lacked the capacity for interinstitutional coordination. They were also in tension with the conservative identity and discourse that the government, in partnership with Islamist movements, imposed in education, media, and public spaces. As a result, living conditions in Saudi cities were lower compared to countries with similar GDP levels. There was a significant gender gap in the job market, education, and freedom of movement, with limited options for entertainment and culture. Public transportation was unavailable, and traffic-related fatalities were among the highest globally. Unemployment rates were high among citizens with even higher rates among women. Additionally, these conditions led to significant amounts of money leaving the country in the form of outbound tourism. In 2015, per capita tourists from Saudi Arabia ranked 17th globally and first in the Middle East, with 16 million travelers spending $ 20 billion. Remittances were also a significant outflow, reaching $49 billion in 2015.
The Saudi government launched the Quality of Life and Human Capability Development programs to address these problems, albeit in a strictly top-down manner. The goals of the Quality of Life program related to the city include “improving the urban landscape in Saudi cities” and “upgrading the quality of services provided in Saudi cities.” In the field of sports, the goals encompass “promoting sports activities in the community” and “achieving excellence in several sports regionally and internationally.”
In terms of entertainment, the objectives are to “develop and diversify entertainment opportunities to meet the needs of the population” and to boost “Saudi contribution to arts and culture.” Key performance indicators to achieve these goals include the ranking of three Saudi cities among the top 100 most livable cities by 2030 and the establishment of 900 hobbyist groups. The first goal of the Human Capability development program is to “strengthen Islamic values and national identity.” This will be done through fostering values such as “moderation and tolerance” and “mastery and discipline” while instilling “national values and strengthening the sense of national belonging.”
To overcome institutional fragmentation and ensure the achievement of these goals, each program was tasked with coordinating the efforts of a group of ministries and institutions. Under the Quality of Life Program, the ministries of Culture, Tourism, and Sport work together with the Commission of Entertainment, while the Human Capability Development program involves the ministries of Education, Human Resources, Economy, and others. Publicly available data regarding the budget of each program are limited. However, during the initial launch of the Quality of Life program for the period between 2018-2020, it was mentioned that it had a budget of $13.3 billion. In 2023, the program’s budget was included as part of the total budget of the Health and Social Development sector, which amounted to $50 billion (16.8 percent of the total 2023 budget). However, there is no publicly available data regarding the budget of the Human Capability Development program.
These two programs constitute the broader context in which deals, such as the one made with Ronaldo, global music and entertainment events, and the removal and modification of various legal and social restrictions in public spaces, take place. The Saudi government has lifted many legal restrictions that were previously enforced in several areas, including restrictions on women, tourism, and entertainment venues such as cinemas, amusement parks, and music festivals, among others. In terms of national identity, under a topic titled “Social and Economic Rights,” the new school curriculum teaches students that citizenship rights include protection of religion, security, education, justice, equality, and quality of life. As for duties, citizens are expected to take pride in their homeland, abide by its laws, demonstrate honesty, trustworthiness, and social participation, and strive for excellence, innovation, and the protection of the environment and public property. In other words, this new social contract marginalizes religion and political rights and prioritizes the social and economic aspects, requiring citizens to transition from relying on the state’s spending to becoming innovators and entrepreneurs with skills that enable them to compete in a global context.
These programs are implemented without public oversight, lack constitutional constraints regarding civil and political rights, and are devoid of mechanisms for public participation in the decision-making process. It appears that the bureaucratic elite managing these programs, many of whom have been educated in democratic countries like the US, the UK, and Canada, do not view the authoritarian characteristics of these programs as liabilities to be addressed or avoided. On the contrary, they seem to perceive them as assets that facilitate their tasks. The extent of coordination between these programs and security policies and institutions remains unclear. At times, security policies appear to be in tension with the goals of these programs, while in other instances, they seem to align with them. Nevertheless, these ambitious, high-budget programs with significant social impact require further in-depth analysis and comparison with other experiments in authoritarian and neoliberal construction of global cities and citizens, such as those taking place in China, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates.
Sultan Alamer is a visiting fellow at the Center of the Middle East Studies at Harvard University and a political science PhD candidate at the George Washington University.
Note:
1. This article was wriiten prior to Lionel Messi signing a contract with Inter Miami of Major League Soccer on June 7, 2023.