Plentiful resources contribute to long-term success if channeled to the development of institutions, but Azerbaijan, like many other autocracies, is instead using them to burnish its image abroad and cement the status quo.
Relations with Russia will have to be overhauled, since the main subject of discussion—Karabakh—will disappear. For most Armenians, the Kremlin will be seen as an unreliable ally that abandoned them in their hour of need.
If the Europeans end up securing relative peace for Armenia and corroborate Azerbaijan’s border encroachments, it will be undeniable that Russia is not the only force Yerevan can rely on.
At some point, Moscow will have to have a serious conversation with Baku about reassessing the existing arrangements in Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan’s favor.
As more Russians flee to neighboring countries and more nationals of those countries go to fight in Ukraine, their governments will find it increasingly difficult to ignore these developments.
If everything continues the way it is going in Nagorno-Karabakh, for the Armenians Russia will become the ally that couldn’t protect it, while for the Azeris it will be the mediator that did the enemy’s bidding.
All the crises that have erupted in Central Asia this year have the same underlying causes: weak political institutions, and governments that dismiss public frustration until it erupts into bloodshed on the streets.
Nothing remotely resembling the “inclusive government” that the Taliban have promised is likely to appear in Afghanistan, while drug trafficking and religious extremism will mushroom.
The CSTO still has a chance to prove itself—if it can demonstrate effective and coordinated work after the impending withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan.
