Konstantin Skorkin is an independent researcher studying political history of Donbass. His work on the conflict in Donbas and Ukrainian politics has appeared in Foreign Affairs, The Moscow Times, Republic.
In occupied Ukraine, upcoming elections highlight the Kremlin’s limited room for maneuver following its declared annexation of parts of Ukraine last year: a costly decision forcing it to pretend that everything is going according to plan.
The Ukrainian government can always justify waging a war against regional grandees as part of the fight against corruption and the desire to prevent Western aid from ending up in the pockets of local clans.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church will never be able to return to its prewar position. There are only two options now: swear allegiance to the new national consensus, or become a pro-Kremlin collaborator.
If no “party of peace” is emerging organically in Ukraine, Moscow appears prepared to create one artificially in order to hold peace talks with Medvedchuk instead of Zelensky: effectively, with itself.
No matter how the war in Ukraine ends, it’s very difficult to imagine the reemergence of pro-Russian political parties there, leaving a political void in the country’s southeast.
It’s true that Ukraine’s oligarchs corrupted the Ukrainian state and undermined effective reform and development, preventing it from escaping from its post-Soviet stagnation. But they were also a key protective mechanism against anyone else usurping power.
The occupying authorities are trying to integrate the region with Russia as quickly as possible, and to create the illusion that Ukraine has abandoned its own people while Russia, on the contrary, is helping them.
Despite numerous blustering announcements that Ukraine’s separatist-held territories are set to become part of Russia, Moscow is in no hurry to hold Crimea-style referendums there, and with good reason.
