Maxim Samorukov is a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.
Before joining Carnegie in 2015, Samorukov worked for the independent news website Slon.ru for five years. He started as a correspondent and then became an editor and international columnist, covering topics including Russian foreign policy, Central Eastern Europe and its relations with Russia, Balkans, and the challenges of transitioning to democracy.
By solving a Russian domestic crisis, the Belarusian leader has effectively joined the ranks of Russian grandees vying for Putin’s favor by eliminating irritating problems that could distract the president from his high-stakes geopolitical machinations.
Regardless of how worn-out Russians may be, therefore, Putin will stick to his selective perception of reality, looking for reasons for and ways to further escalate his addictive crusade against the current world order.
Without the assistance of local actors, Russian influence in the Western Balkans would disappear overnight. But the opposite is also true. As long as local politicians can capitalize on invoking Moscow’s long shadow, Russia will remain a salient part of the Balkan landscape.
Given how thoroughly Ukraine has overshadowed all other Russian foreign policy objectives, it seems unlikely that Moscow would embark on another risky undertaking with unclear prospects in the Western Balkans.
A recent poll showed that 46 percent of Serbs believe that their country should stay neutral in the Russia-Ukraine war, confirming that a balancing act appears to be the least costly strategy for the Serbian government.
Neither the better morale and superior technology of the Ukrainians nor the lack of equipment, training, and motivation of freshly drafted Russians have prevented Russia from achieving its interim military aims at a relatively modest political cost.
Russia’s international reputation is already in tatters. The last thing it needs now is another humiliating blow that would expose how little sway it actually has over Balkan affairs as soon as its priorities diverge from those of its associates.
The war has left Belarus in a predicament, which boils down to depending on Russia for everything without enjoying the advantages of being part of Russia. In combination with the simmering domestic crisis, it leaves ever fewer incentives for the ruling nomenklatura and wider society to value the current Belarusian statehood.
