Andrei Kolesnikov writes about a spontaneous association of mothers and wives of mobilized men in Russia. Are they just petitioners demanding that the state not treat their loved ones like cannon fodder? Or are we witnessing the birth of an anti-war protest in Russian society?
Putin has managed to persuade a large section of Russians that the “special operation” of 2022 is a natural continuation of World War II. In essence, it is an existential war between the Russian civilization and the West.
A better outcome is possible, but by implicating the entire country in his war, Putin has now made it that much harder to obtain: a result in which Russia begins to move from authoritarianism to democracy.
Why is Putin taking the risk? Because he himself has encouraged the lack of public attention to the war for several months. Mobilization is fraught with serious discontent in society. That is precisely why he decided to make a partial mobilization, rather than a full one.
In the 23 years since his de facto accession to power, Putin has not only built a regime of great brutality. He has also succeeded in hypnotizing much of the Russian population to an extent that civil society has been driven largely into the catacombs and his rule appears to be unshakable.
Rather than consolidating Russian society, the conflict in Ukraine has exacerbated existing divisions on a diverse array of issues, including support for the regime. Put another way, the impression that Putin now has the full support of the Russian public is simply incorrect.
The Soviet Union under Gorbachev was more free than Russia today. Back then, it was thanks to him that we had something we do not have right now: hope for a better future and faith that there is a way out of all this.